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A physical zero-knowledge object-comparison
system for nuclear warhead verification
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Zero-knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods to demonstrate the validity
of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself. The possibility of
using such proofs to process classified and other sensitive physical data has attracted
attention, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Here we demonstrate a non-elec-
tronic fast neutron differential radiography technique using superheated emulsion detectors
that can confirm that two objects are identical without revealing their geometry or compo-
sition. Such a technique could form the basis of a verification system that could confirm the
authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. More broadly,
by demonstrating a physical zero-knowledge proof that can compare physical properties of
objects, this experiment opens the door to developing other such secure proof-systems for
other applications.
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T
he next round of arms-control agreements may require a
trusted verification mechanism to confirm the authenticity
of items presented as nuclear warheads. Proliferation and
national security concerns require, however, that such a
verification mechanism reveals no information about the
composition or design of these warheads1–3. Considerable
research efforts have been directed towards the development
of engineered information barriers to address this paradox4,5.
These barriers consist of automated measurement and analysis
systems that process sensitive information but only display the
results of internal analysis in a binary manner (valid object and
invalid object). These systems are, by their nature, at risk of
electronic tampering and snooping—and their trusted
implementation has so far proved difficult to realize6–8.
Glaser, Barak and Goldston (GBG)6 have recently proposed a
different approach based on a zero-knowledge interactive proof,
or protocol, for warhead verification. Physical zero-knowledge
protocols can be used to perform comparisons or computations
on physical data such that sensitive information is never
measured and does not need to be protected afterwards9. They
rely on the concept of interactive zero-knowledge proofs,
originally developed for computational cryptographic
applications10, which have the property of yielding no
knowledge beyond the validity of the assertion being proven.
This property remains guaranteed only if the prover follows
the protocol11. Attempts at cheating open the possibility
of information leakage, a potential deterrent for a range of
attacks6,7. The timely demonstration of a trusted zero-
knowledge warhead inspection system would represent a
breakthrough towards a verification regime targeted at deeper
and multilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals. Other critical
applications of physical zero-knowledge proofs could include
any system where classified or personal data need to be
protected, such as in forensic DNA analysis9.
We have devised a physical zero-knowledge system, using a
non-electronic neutron differential radiography technique, to
perform reproducible object comparison without ever acquiring
data about the objects being compared. We employ this system to
demonstrate experimentally the validity of key aspects of the
protocol for warhead verification proposed by GBG. In a real
inspection, this protocol requires the existence of at least one
reference warhead, for example, retrieved from active delivery
systems12,13 at the inspector’s designation. Using simple
radiographic test objects, we find experimentally that items
practically identical to the reference item can be confirmed to be
genuine while inspectors gain no knowledge about their geometry
and composition. Furthermore, items differing significantly from
the reference item can be discriminated.
Results
A zero-knowledge object-comparison system. Our technique
compares the neutron radiographic profile of an inspected item
against that of a reference item at various energies (in particular
14MeV) to confirm that the items are identical within experi-
mental accuracy (Fig. 1). In the case of nuclear weapons, such
data are highly sensitive. We circumvent this problem by
recording the radiographs of the inspected items on sets of pre-
viously exposed superheated emulsion (bubble) detectors14
preloaded with the ‘complement’ of the transmission image of
the reference item (or any item claimed to be similar to the
reference item; Fig. 1a). In this case, the ‘complement’
implemented by the host, the owner of the items, is defined as
the preload that will result in the total fluence recorded in each
detector being the same as if no item had been present when the
inspected item is the same as the reference item—we call this total
count Nmax. Such a radiograph with a flat profile of Nmax and
Poisson noise conveys zero information. We emphasize that the
inspector is not present while the host prepares the preloads. In
the GBG protocol the inspector is offered multiple sets of
detectors preloaded by the host and then randomly selects which
to use either with the reference item(s) or with the inspected
item(s). This prevents the host from matching with certainty a
modified preload to a spoof warhead. The use of non-electronic
detectors in the protocol also avoids the risks of electronic
tampering by the host once the preload has been selected and of
electronic snooping by the inspector to attempt to learn the
preload pattern.
The inspection protocol. We envision that the GBG protocol
could be realized the following way: first, the host declares (n 1)
items as ‘treaty accountable items’ that are to be inspected and
compared with a reference item (for a total of n items). Here we
assume a single reference item, but there could be more than one
in principle. The host claims that all n items are identical. Then,
the parties must agree to the appropriate level of statistics for the
inspection. This includes agreeing on Nmax as well as any statis-
tical test to be applied to the data. Probabilities of passing a test
depend on random choices made by the inspector and the
measurement noise, which are independent between each invo-
cation of the inspection test. Finally, we assume that parties have
agreed on procedures for chain of custody, perimeter monitoring
and other security measures related to the conduct of the
inspections.
Initialization
1. The host produces a collection of detectors. He measures and
records their neutron efficiency curves. The inspector then
chooses a subset of these detectors to be used in the
inspections, and can take home the others and independently
confirm their calibration curves.
2. The host takes a large number of radiographs of non-reference
items at m different angles, and l different incoming neutron
energies minimizing any systematic errors in the preloads. The
radiographs can be taken on non-reference items to avoid
difficulties associated with maintaining chain of custody for
the reference item, which is the only item inspectors believed
to be genuine before inspections start.
Preparation of preloads. The host, without the inspector present,
prepares n preloaded detector sets pki;j with k¼ 1yn, each
corresponding to the complement image of the treaty accountable
items (claimed to be identical to the reference) at a particular
angle yi, for i¼ 1ym, and particular energy Ej, for j¼ 1yl.
Inspection
1. The inspector calls for an orientation yi of the items and
energy Ej of the neutron beam.
2. The host presents the corresponding n preloaded detector sets
p1i;j; . . . ; p
n
i;j to the inspector (including the associated calibra-
tion data). The inspector chooses a random assignment of the
detector sets to the reference item and (n 1) inspected items.
3. The items are exposed to the neutron source and their
radiographs are recorded on the preloaded detectors. Both
parties monitor the source fluence—each with their own
apparatus. This ensures the inspector that a measurement is
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taking place, and that the agreed fluence corresponding to
Nmax has been provided.
4. After the inspection of each item, the number of macroscopic
bubbles in each detector is counted. Both parties compute the
result of the agreed upon test for the hypothesis that the
distribution of the counts is n independent Poisson random
variables each with expectation Nmax.
5. Some detectors, as selected by the inspector, are recompressed
(to remove the bubbles, preparing them for re-use) and re-
exposed to the source to verify their functionality and specified
calibration.
Test repetition. The inspection phase can be repeated to increase
arbitrarily the soundness of the proof. The inspector can decide to
re-test items at the same angle and energy (for example, if a
particular item has failed the test), or continue to test the items at
another (yi, Ej) pair. By this means, the protocol can meet
arbitrarily stringent overall false-positive and -negative rates by
accumulating statistics. Strategies to minimize the effort to
achieve specific overall type I and type II errors will be the subject
of a future publication.
In this realization, we assume that the inspector follows the
protocol described here. All actions of the inspector, unlike those
of the host, are performed in public view of both parties. In
particular, the inspector has only access to the bubble count in
each detector using an agreed-upon bubble-counting technique.
She does not, for example, have any possibility to measure the
neutron-induced activation level of the bubble detectors.
Properties of the protocol. Zero knowledge: At the end of the
protocol, if the host behaved honestly, we expect the total bubble
count in each detector to be Poisson-distributed with expectation
value Nmax, the sum of a matching preload and radiograph—
equal to the total count if no item had been present between the
source and the detectors. For the zero-knowledge property to be
conserved, neither the signal nor the noise may carry
information.
For a particle beam experiment, where many particles would
strike a detector for every recorded interaction, and in the case
where discrete counts are independent, random and occurring at
a constant rate, the counts should be distributed according to a
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Figure 1 | Experimental realization of a physical zero-knowledge object comparison system. (a) Concept of zero-knowledge differential neutron
radiography using superheated droplet detectors. Items are exposed to a neutron beam and their 2D transmission radiographs are recorded on detectors
preloaded with the complement radiograph (including Poisson noise) of a reference item. If the item is valid (identical to the reference), the final radiograph
is identical to the expected exposure if no object had been present (in the ideal implementation the root mean square deviation from the expected bubble
count, Nmax, is solely because of Poisson noise, (Nmax)
0.5). If the item is a spoof with an experimentally significantly different radiograph, some
characteristic features appear in the final radiograph (the results are no longer zero-knowledge) and the inspector rejects the proof. Each pixel represents
the bubble count from a single superheated droplet (bubble) detector. (b) Picture of an irradiated superheated droplet (bubble) detector. Some metastable
droplets vapourized and expanded into macroscopic bubbles after a neutron interaction. The bubble count reflects the total fluence delivered to the
detector. (c) One-dimensional experimental realization with superheated droplet detector array, reference item (black box hood not shown) on staging area
and aperture of a 14MeV collimated neutron beam. The set-up is placed in a room shielded with borated concrete walls. A fast neutron counter (not
shown) monitored the source fluence along the axial direction. (d) Composition and pattern of the reference item with detector positions (AL, aluminium;
SS, stainless steel).
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Poisson distribution15–17. Recalling that the sum of two
independent Poisson random variables is a Poisson random
variable18, we obtain that the sum of the radiograph and its
matching complement is Poisson-distributed with parameter
Nmax—that is, both the mean and variance of this distribution are
Nmax, in the limit of high accuracy of calibration and preload as
discussed infra.
Therefore, as long as the items are identical, the verifier
observes n independent draws from a Poisson(Nmax) random
variable. Since the inspector could have sampled this a priori, she
does not learn anything.
Soundness and completeness: The soundness and completeness
of the protocol are based on the assumption that two items with
significantly different geometry and/or composition result in a
difference in the expected bubble counts. ‘Significant differences’
are defined by the parties within the treaty protocol.
Neutron counts in the detectors are affected by the geometry
and physical properties of the item. For example, neutron opacity
depends on the total neutron cross-section, which is energy- and
nuclide-dependent; neutron intensities and their distributions at
large angles depend on elastic and inelastic scattering, fission and
(n,2n) reaction cross-sections, again energy- and nuclide-
dependent; geometry and fissile material composition affect the
neutron multiplication factor, which is also energy-dependent.
Exposing the inspected item to different neutron energies
allows verifying that both geometry and material composition are
not significantly different. Energies at which neutrons are highly
penetrating (such as 14-MeV neutrons) or where large differences
in fission cross-sections19, or large resonances in the total cross-
section20 exist, are of particular interest. It is possible to probe the
object at an energy lower than the detector energy threshold for
bubble nucleation to emphasize differences in the fission
signature21.
Formally, we assume that if an item X is not significantly
different from the reference item, then it passes inspections at all
angle–energy (yi, Ej) pairs with probability of at least (1 a),
where a is the false-positive rate. Furthermore, we make the
physical assumption that there exists b such that for any reference
item X and any object Y created by the adversary, if Y
significantly differs from X, then there exists an orientation–
energy pair (yi, Ej) such that testing with these parameters the
inspector will declare the item to pass the inspection with
probability of at most b.
If the host is cheating, at least sZ1 spoofs are presented for
inspection. Suppose the host also provide ps spoof preloads
(defined as the complement of the spoof item) and (n ps) valid
preloads (complement of the reference item). One of the
following cases must apply:
In the first case, s 6¼ ps, then either at least one spoof is tested
against a valid preload or at least one valid item is tested against a
spoof preload. In either case, the cheating host evades detection
with probability of at most b.
In the second case, s¼ ps, one of the items will be tested against
the wrong type of preload with probability 1 1C n;sð Þ where C(n,s)
is the number of s combinations from the set of n items. Thus, the
adversary evades detection with probability of at most
1=C n; sð Þþ b 1 1=C n; sð Þð Þ. In this case, the probability of
evasion is always greater than b. Therefore, such a cheating
strategy should always be preferred over s 6¼ ps.
Since s  n 1, the probability of evasion is maximized when
s¼ ps¼ 1 or s¼ ps¼ n 1. Since s is under host control, we
assume that the host will present n 1 spoofs and their associated
spoof preloads. In this case, the probability to evade detection is
bounded by 1=nþb 1 1=nð Þ. Therefore, for the protocol
to be sound 1=nþb 1 1=nð Þo1 a, which can also be
written as bo1 an=ðn 1Þ. In the worst case, n¼ 2
(only one reference and one inspected item), bo1 2a, which
also means that ao1/2.
As noted above, the probability of evading detection can be
arbitrarily reduced by re-testing. This would also detect cases
where the host provides n preloads with counts between those of
the spoof and the reference item. The closer b is to
1 an=ðn 1Þ, the more repetition will be needed to ensure a
high soundness level, however. Efficient and acceptable testing
strategies based on the values of a, b and the soundness and
completeness levels negotiated between parties will need to be
developed. For n¼ 10 and b¼ 0.1, the probability of evasion
would be equal to 0.19, which may be sufficient to deter the host
from using the strategies we described.
Experimental realization. For this proof of principle, and to
provide a physical basis to the GBG protocol, we inspected simple
items in one orientation with one neutron beam energy fixed at
14MeV. We represented the reference warhead and the inspected
items by combinations of 2-inch cubes of aluminium and steel.
The cubes attenuate differently 14MeV neutrons (44% and 27%
for 2.54 cm of steel and aluminium, respectively) and can be
arranged in different patterns. Figure 1c shows the experimental
set-up, as well as the cube pattern used to represent the internal
components of the reference item. The item also included a ‘black
box’ aluminium hood to mimic the fact that inspected objects
would likely be in containers, hiding their appearance. In a real
implementation, to prevent disclosure of the preload, the detec-
tors would also be covered with visually opaque material until the
irradiation of the items was complete. In addition, a fast neutron
counter monitors the source fluence to assure that it is the agreed
value to produce the total number of bubbles expected in the
detectors in the absence of a test item.
To prove the validity and usefulness of our technique, we tested
both its ability to convey zero knowledge in cases where the item
presented for inspection is identical to the reference item (valid
case) and its robustness to detect cases in which the cube pattern
had been altered, referred to as spoofs.
For an interactive zero-knowledge proof applied to nuclear
warhead verification, the burden of proof22 falls on the host
(the owner of the inspected items) to demonstrate that his claim
is robust while his secrets are protected. As mentioned earlier, to
prepare the inspection, the host must calibrate the measurement
system and appropriately characterize the reference item.
The calibration will be checked by inspectors through test
irradiations in the absence of interposed items. In our
demonstration, after characterizing the fluence response
function, f, of the detector system, we acquired 10 radiographs
of the reference item and summed the results at each detector
position. Each exposure lasted B4min; without an interposed
item, the corresponding fluence would produce a total value of
NmaxB1,200 bubbles.
Once the reference item is fully characterized, the host can
produce the necessary complementary radiographs, by irradia-
ting the bare detectors to a fluence equal to
f  1 Nmaxð Þ f  1 Nref ;i
 
where f 1 is the inverse of the detector
response function (counted bubbles as a function of counts from
the reference fast neutron detector), and Nref,i the bubble count
obtained from the radiograph of the reference item at every
position i¼ {1,...,7}. f is a nonlinear function of the number of
bubbles present in a bubble detector. The nonlinearity is because
of bubbles occulting one another in the photographic images used
for bubble counting (see Fig. 1b). Individual exposure was kept at
NB120 to avoid large nonlinear bubble-counting response. The
analysis reported hereafter is based on the number of bubbles
present in the detectors, which is somewhat larger than the
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number counted, obtained by correcting the data for bubble
occultation (See Methods). In practice, when preparing detectors
for individual exposure, we used a linear approximation to f,
which introduced a o2% error in the preloads.
It is necessary to correct for the slight difference in gain
between bubble detectors and for the effect of the location of any
given detector. The number of bubbles is not exactly Nmax in each
detector exposed to the same fluence when no item is present.
Using data from 10 different exposures of the detectors at a
fluence f 1(Nmax), we found that our detectors differed in
efficiency with 3.7% 1s dispersion. We corrected our results to
take these variations into account. This calibration itself
introduces a variance of Nmax in the final experimental
results. The total expected variance for our measurements
consists of (1) this calibration variance, Nmax, (2) the variance
of the radiograph of the reference item (or valid item), Nref,
(3) the variance of the preload, NmaxNref and (4) the variance of
the subsequent exposure of the inspected item,
Nitem. The calibration variance (1) and the reference radiograph
variance (2) can be driven down as low as desired by the
inspector and the host, respectively. The former will improve
the sensitivity of the measurement, while the latter will prevent
this variance from being a source of information leakage
when a large number of valid items is inspected. In the limit
where only variance sources (3) and (4) play a role, and an
valid item is presented, therefore, Nitem¼Nref, then the expected
distribution is Poisson with the mean value Nmax and variance
Nmax.
Experimental results. We performed measurements for five
different scenarios, one with an inspected item identical to
the reference item and four scenarios with spoofs whose cube
patterns differed from that of the reference item. During the
inspections, the patterns were placed under the ‘black box’ hood
and their radiographs recorded on a set of seven bubble detectors
preloaded with the complement radiograph of the reference item.
Each scenario was repeated 10 times and the bubble counts were
summed to achieve an effective Nmax¼ 1,191. The use of 10
measurements allowed us to use the variance of the mean to
determine the error bars in the measurement experimentally. In
general, this variance was found to be indistinguishable from the
measurement as expected from Poisson statistics (see Methods).
Figure 2a summarizes all our experimental results (the results
uncorrected for occultation are shown in Methods). Figure 2b
shows good agreement between Monte–Carlo neutron transport
simulations of the experiment that calculated the neutron fluence
in the detectors using the code Monte Carlo N-particle23, and the
experimental results. These data also support the validity of our
nonlinear occultation model.
In the ‘valid’ case, data are randomly distributed
around Nmax and the measured mean variance from
Nmax,
P7
i¼1
ðN NmaxÞ2
7 ¼ 2646, is in good agreement with the
predicted value of
P7
i¼1 ðð2Nmax þNref Þ
0:5
7 Þ2 ¼ 2964. This is consistent
with an inspector gaining no knowledge about the transmission
profile of the reference item from this measurement. In the first
diversion scenario (Spoof1), the cubes making up the inspected item
are swapped from left to right compared with the reference item.
This change can be easily identified in the data. The next two
diversion scenarios (Spoof2 and Spoof3) consisted of altering the
reference item pattern by either adding (increased attenuation) or
removing (decreased attenuation) a single steel cube. Again, both
cases are clearly identified as different from the reference item with
very high confidence. Finally, in the last case (Spoof4), an
aluminium cube replaced a steel cube on the right side (small
reduction of the attenuation). This case could be considered an
acceptable spoof detection, with P¼ 0.013, depending on the
agreement between host and inspector. The data, however, suggest
that a tighter criterion or repeated testing be used for this
magnitude of P.
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Figure 2 | Experimental evidence of a practical physical zero-knowledge
proof. (a) Experimental results for the five inspection scenarios
investigated (valid item and four spoofs denominated Spoof1 to Spoof4).
The item patterns are represented for each scenario with white as empty,
light grey as aluminium and dark grey as steel. The results are corrected for
the nonlinear counting effect. Error bars represent one s.e.m. calculated at
each detector position from the 10 measurements performed for each
scenario and the calibration data (obtained from 10 measurements with no
item). The light grey band around Nmax represents the expected error from
a valid item (2NmaxþNref)0.5. The dark grey band corresponds to the
minimum achievable value with Nmax bubbles, (Nmax)
0.5. The test statistic
T ¼P7i¼1 ðNNmaxÞ
2
2Nmax þNref was compared with a w
2 distribution with 7 degrees of
freedom, giving the following results for each scenario: Valid, T¼ 6.60,
P¼0.474; Spoof 1, T¼453.35, Po10 16; Spoof 2, T¼ 132.72, Po10 16;
Spoof 3, T¼ 87.80, P¼ 3. 10 16; Spoof 4, T¼ 17.88, P¼0.013. (b)
Observed and deduced true bubble count, from all scenarios at every
position with interposed objects, versus corresponding Monte Carlo
simulations obtained from the computational model of the experiment. The
red dashed curve is obtained from our bubble occultation model using the
calibration data with no interposed objects (see Methods). Error bars
represent one s.e.m. calculated from measurements and calibration data.
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Discussion
This experiment demonstrates the key aspects of the viability of
non-electronic differential fast neutron radiography to perform
zero-knowledge object comparison, establishing a physical basis
for the nuclear warhead verification approach proposed by GBG.
It constitutes the demonstration of a physical zero-knowledge
proof protocol for a practical high-security application that can
compare physical properties of objects. We have shown that the
combination of pre-loading and direct measurement on an honest
object gives the desired null result, with a well-understood level of
noise. We have identified areas where the noise can be reduced to
improve the technique. We have also explored the capability of
this technique at the level of Nmax¼ 1,200 bubbles for detecting
diversions. Further research, at higher bubble counts, with
different neutron energies, and with special nuclear materials,
will be needed to assess the capabilities of the system for the full
range of relevant diversion scenarios.
Methods
Experimental set-up. The radiographs of the test items are performed using
14MeV neutrons from a D–T neutron generator (Thermofisher B320) with a yield
of B108 neutrons per second. The generator is placed inside a borated poly-
ethylene cylinder (1m high 1.2m in diameter) with a 5 cm high and 17 degree-
wide fan-shaped collimating slot. A single row of seven specially made superheated
droplet neutron (or ‘bubble’) detectors are placedB110 cm away from the source,
behind the test item. The items are mounted on a stand affixed to a honeycomb
aluminium optical table allowing precise and reproducible positioning (staging area
in Fig. 1). A fast neutron counter (Eljen EJ-410 zinc sulfide scintillator) monitors
the generator output during irradiation by detecting neutrons emerging from a
channel at the bottom of the polyethylene cylinder. The complete apparatus is
placed in a room shielded by borated concrete walls at the Princeton Plasma
Physics Laboratory (Plainsboro, USA).
The detectors developed for this application14,19 consist of glass tubes filled with
emulsions of superheated octafluorocyclobutane (C4F8, fluorocarbon C-318)
100mm diameter droplets homogeneously dispersed in a viscous aqueous gel
matrix (4,000 per cm3). At 21 C the detectors are only sensitive to neutrons above
1MeV and insensitive to gamma rays. When a metastable droplet vapourizes,
because of a sufficiently energetic neutron interaction, it expands into a stable
bubble about six times larger in diameter. The detectors can be irradiated
several times in series, recording the total fluence to which they were exposed
(pre-loadable property). If an isostatic pressure of 500 p.s.i. is applied to the
aqueous gel for B10min, the bubbles are recondensed into superheated droplets.
All bubble detectors used in this study were manufactured from the same batch.
Fourteen detectors were chosen out of twenty-one after being irradiated several
times at every position forB6min to compare their relative behaviour. The chosen
detectors exhibited a 3.7% 1 s dispersion and were calibrated to allow
determination of their absolute efficiency (of the order of 4 10 4 bubbles per
crossing neutron in an active volume of 5.3 cm3).
Data were acquired in two ways to study the effect of recompression on the
detector response. One detector batch corresponding to 5,000, 10,000, up to 25,000,
fast neutron counts were irradiated, measured, recompressed and then irradiated to
the next higher level. A second batch was irradiated, counted and then further
irradiated to provide data at 2,500, 7,500, and so on, counts. The recompression
was shown to have no detectable effect on the measurements.
Because the energy threshold of bubble nucleation is temperature-dependent,
we monitored the temperature of the detectors throughout the study. The
experimental hall was temperature-controlled and the detector temperature
exhibited minor variations over all measurements (20.79±0.34 C).
After irradiation, photographs of the detectors were taken using a commercial
instrument (BDR-III reader, Bubble Technology Industries (BTI)) at multiple
angles. The bubbles were then counted with the associated BTI software with
settings modified to accommodate our detector tubes. The results were cross-
checked with visual counting using large printed copies of the images. The main
challenge of these techniques stems from the correct segmentation of bubbles that
overlap in the two-dimensional (2D) image.
Bubble occultation model. Before starting any measurements, we carefully
characterized the fluence response of our detector system, bvis¼ f(n), where bvis is
the number of bubbles recorded by the reading system and n the counts from the
fast neutron detector. A nonlinear behaviour emerged, because of the bubble-
counting method used in the experiments. Bubbles are counted from a 2D (y,z)
projection of the volume perpendicular to the x axis (direction of light) and parallel
to the vertical z axis of the cylindrical detector. Thus, bubbles at the same z and y
positions may occult one another. (Note that these data do not necessarily imply
that BTI bubble detectors read with BTI equipment produce the level of non-
linearity we observed. These results apply only to our own detectors with tailored
settings to accommodate our specific material and geometric conditions.) To
account for this nonlinear effect, we used a simple particle interaction model. For
an observer placed far away from the detector and looking in the x direction, a new
bubble will be visible only if its image does not cross an old bubble. Thus, we can
assume that for each new bubble, on average the observer only sees e
 brsd
V bubbles,
where V is the counting volume, d is a characteristic width of the cylinder along the
line of sight, s the effective occultation cross-section and br the real number of
bubbles at the time a new bubble is created. Averaging over the cylinder indicates
that d should be taken to be 4/p times the cylinder radius. We expect the number
of real bubbles to be a linear function of the neutron count in the fast neutron
detector because only a very small fraction of the droplets have vapourized
(B0.6% for 4min irradiation), and the fractional volume occupied by the
vapourized droplets is very small (B0.25% volume displacement). Thus, we
assume that dbrdn ¼ e. This gives us the rate at which visible bubbles accumulate as a
function of neutron irradiation, dbvisdn ¼ ee
 brsd
V , and integrating this expression, using
br¼ en, we obtain bvis ¼ Vsd ð1 e
 ensd
V Þ. This model has efficiency e at low fluence
and saturates, when br goes to infinity, at bvis ¼ Vsd.
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Figure 3 | Uncorrected experimental results. Uncorrected experimental
results for the five inspection scenarios investigated and defined in the
Results section (valid item and four diversions denominated Spoof1 to
Spoof4). Data points are presented with one s.e.m. error bars calculated at
each detector position from the 10 measurements performed for each
scenario and the calibration data (obtained from 10 measurements with no
item). The grey band is ð2NmaxÞ0:5 centred on Nmax.
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Figure 4 | Analysis of the superheated droplet detector variance. Plot of
the logarithm of the variance versus the logarithm of the average number of
true (corrected) bubbles. The data and one s.d. error bars were obtained by
bootstrapping the corrected experimental results (1,000 samples per data
point).
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Calibration data, obtained at increasing exposures without interposed items,
were fitted to this model to obtain the true number of bubbles br from bvis.
(In practice, this calibration procedure also compensates for the small effects
because of droplet vapourization and occupied volume.) Data obtained later from
the detector preloads confirmed the good fit and reproducibility of this effect.
We find that the effective cross-section s is equivalent to a disk with a radius of the
order of twice the radius of a single bubble (B300 mm), effectively corresponding
to two bubbles touching one another.
Uncorrected inspection results. In the main section, the inspection results were
corrected for the nonlinear effect introduced by the reading technique. Figure 3
presents the uncorrected data. These results were directly obtained from the
readout, and calibrated to account for spatial and detector gain differences as
explained in the main text.
Detector variance. The zero-knowledge property of our protocol depends
on its ability to carry information neither in the signal nor in the noise of the
measurements. Since we are measuring radiation, the sum of the detector counts
(preload and radiograph of inspected item) should follow Poisson statistics. Thus,
at each position we expect the data obtained for all detectors to have a variance
equal to their bubble count. To verify that the noise of our detector varies as
ffiffiffiffi
N
p
,
we generated synthetic data from our experimental results using the bootstrapping
method24. The bootstrapping method consists of estimating population parameters
by randomly sampling with replacement from an approximating distribution (here
the empirical population obtained from our experimental data). We used 10
measurements for each inspection scenario (there are 5) as well as 10 radiographs
of the reference item and 10 preloads (complement radiographs) as starting data
sets. A measurement corresponds to 7 data points for each position. We generated
1,000 synthetic measurements for each case to obtain the bootstrapped mean and
variance with their respective error bars. The results presented in Fig. 4 shows good
agreement with the expected
ffiffiffiffi
N
p
noise from Poisson statistics. Note that here we
are using br deduced from the nonlinear model. The good agreement indicates that
the occultation process and its correction do not introduce significant additional
noise at the level of nonlinearity explored.
Data availability. Source data for figures are available from the corresponding
author upon request.
References
1. Comley, C. et al. Confidence, Security & Verification: the Challenge of Global
Nuclear Weapons Arms Control (Atomic Weapons Establishment, 2000).
2. National Academy of Sciences CISAC, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and
Nuclear-Explosive Materials: an Assessment of Methods and Capabilities
(National Academies Press, 2005).
3. Stone, R. Not-seeing is believing. Science 344, 1436–1437 (2014).
4. Spears, D. (ed.) Technology R&D for Arms Control (US Department of Energy,
Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering, 2001).
5. Evans, N. Software Development and Authentication for Arms Control
Information Barriers. In FM 2015: formal Methods 581–584 (Springer
International Publishing, 2015).
6. Glaser, A., Barak, B. & Goldston, R. A zero-knowledge protocol for nuclear
warhead verification. Nature 510, 497–502 (2014).
7. Philippe, S., Barak, B. & Glaser, A. Designing protocols for nuclear warhead
verification. In Proc. 56th Annual INMM Meeting (Indian Wells, CA, USA,
2015).
8. Fisch, B., Freund, D. & Naor, M. Secure Physical Computation using
Disposable Circuits. In Theory of Cryptography 182–198 (Springer, 2015).
9. Fisch, B., Freund, D. & Naor, M. Physical Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Physical
Properties. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2014 313–336 (Springer,
2014).
10. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S. & Rackoff, C. The knowledge complexity of
interactive proof-systems. SIAM J. Comput. 18, 186–208 (1989).
11. Goldreich, O. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools (Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
12. Marleau, P. et al. Report on a zero-knowledge protocol tabletop exercise
(SAND2015-5075, Sandia National Laboratory, 2015).
13. Yan, J. & Glaser, A. Nuclear warhead verification: a review of attribute and
template systems. Sci. Global Security 23, 157–170 (2015).
14. d’Errico, F. Radiation dosimetry and spectrometry with superheated emulsions.
Nucl. Instrum. Methods Phys. Res. B 184, 229–254 (2001).
15. Knoll, G. F. Radiation Detection and Measurement (John Wiley & Sons, 2010).
16. Lyons, L. Statistics for Nuclear and Particle Physicists (Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
17. James, F. Statistical Methods in Experimental Physics 2nd edn (World Scientific,
2006).
18. Lehmann, E. L. & Romano, J. P. Testing Statistical Hypotheses, 3rd edn
(Springer, New York, 2005).
19. Goldston, R. J. et al. Zero-knowledge warhead verification: system requirements
and detector technology. In Proc. 55th Annual INMM Meeting (Atlanta, GA,
USA, 2014).
20. Chen, G & Lanza, R. C. Fast neutron resonance radiography for elemental
imaging: theory and applications. IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 49, 1919–1924
ð2002Þ:
21. Yan, J. & Glaser, A. Two-color neutron detection for zero-knowledge nuclear
warhead verification. In Proc. 56th Annual INMM Meeting (Indian Wells, CA,
USA, 2015).
22. Kaplow, L. Burden of proof. Yale L.J 121, 738–859 (2012).
23. A general Monte Carlo N-particle (MCNP) transport code, version 6.1.0.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, mcnp.lanl.gov.
24. Efron, B. & Tibshirani, R. J. An Introduction to the Bootstrap (CRC press,
1994).
Acknowledgements
Princeton University, Yale University and the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
received support for this research through DOE/NNSA’s Consortium for Verification
Technology, DE-NA 0002534. Financial support was also provided by the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. We
thank B. Barak for his advice on the protocol construction and assumptions, A. Carpe
and the Health Physics team of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory for their aid
during the conduct of the experiments, M. Gattas-Sethi (Yale University) for manu-
facturing the detectors, Z. Mian, M. Ku¨tt and three reviewers for providing helpful
comments on the manuscript. All simulations were run on Princeton University’s High
Performance Cluster.
Author contributions
S.P. designed and built the apparatus, simulated and conducted the laboratory experi-
ments. R.J.G. and A.G. mentored S.P. and contributed, along with S.P., to the elaboration
of the protocol and the analysis of the data. F.d’E. developed the detectors and partici-
pated in their characterization. All contributed to the manuscript.
Additional information
Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial
interests.
Reprints and permission information is available online at http://npg.nature.com/
reprintsandpermissions/
How to cite this article: Philippe, S. et al. A physical zero-knowledge object-
comparison system for nuclear warhead verification. Nat. Commun. 7:12890
doi: 10.1038/ncomms12890 (2016).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise
in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license,
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
r The Author(s) 2016
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms12890 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 7:12890 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms12890 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 7
